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Abstract. We show that the hierarchy of level r consensus partially
collapses. In particular, any profile pi ∈ P that exhibits consensus of
level (K− 1)! around ≻0 in fact exhibits consensus of level 1 around ≻0.
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The concept of level r consensus was introduced in [1] in the context of the
metric approach in social choice theory. We will mainly use the notation and
definitions of [1]. Let A = {1, 2, . . . ,K} be a set of K > 2 alternatives and
let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of individuals. Each linear order (i.e. complete,
transitive and antisymmetric binary relation) on the set A is called a preference
relation. The set of all preference relations is denoted by P . The inversion metric
is the function d : P × P → R defined by
d(≻,≻′) =
|(≻ \ ≻′) ∪ (≻′ \ ≻)|
2
(since all preference relations in P have the same cardinality we have also:
d(≻,≻′) = | ≻ \ ≻′ | = | ≻′ \ ≻ |).
Let ≻0 be a preference relation in P . A metric on P allows to determine which
one of any two preference relations is closer to a third one. This comparison can
be extended to equal-sized sets of preferences.
Definition 1 Let C and C′ be two disjoint nonempty subsets of P with the
same cardinality, and let ≻0∈ P be a preference relation on A. We say that C
is at least as close to ≻0 as C
′, denoted by C ≥≻0 C
′, if there is a one-to-one
function φ : C → C′ such that for all ≻∈ C, d(≻,≻0) ≤ d(φ(≻),≻0). We also
say that C is closer than C′ to ≻0, denoted by C >≻0 C
′, if there is a one to
one function φ : C → C′ such that for all ≻∈ C, d(≻,≻0) ≤ d(φ(≻),≻0), with
strict inequality for at least one ≻∈ C.
Using the concept of closeness the authors define the correspondence between
preference profiles pi ∈ Pn and preference relations ≻∈ P depending on a natural
parameter r called “preference profile pi exhibits consensus of level r around ≻”.
For any pi = (≻1,≻2, . . . ,≻n) ∈ P
n, ≻∈ P , and C ⊆ P
µpi(≻) = |{i ∈ N :≻i=≻}|, µpi(C) = |{i ∈ N :≻i∈ C}|
(obviously, µpi(C) =
∑
≻∈C µpi(≻)).
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Definition 2 Let r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K!2 }, and let ≻0∈ P. A preference profile pi ∈ P
n
exhibits consensus of level r around ≻0 if
1. for all disjoint subsets C,C′ of P with cardinality r, C ≥≻0 C
′ → µpi(C) ≥
µpi(C
′)
2. there are disjoint subsets C,C′ of P with cardinality r, such that C >≻0 C
′
and µpi(C) > µpi(C
′).
Proposition 1 of [1] states that the set of profiles that exhibit consensus of
level r + 1 around ≻0 extends the set of profiles that exhibit consensus of level
r around ≻0. Thus, each preference relation ≻0 determines the hierarchy of
preference profiles.
Let a preference profile pi exhibit consensus of level r around ≻0. We call ≻0
a level r consensus relation of pi and simply consensus relation of pi if r = K!2
(the level K!2 is the maximum level for which this concept is nontrivial).
A level r consensus relation ≻0 of profile pi may be considered as one of
probable social binary relations on the profile pi. Theorem 1 of [1] states that if
n is odd, then each profile pi have at most one consensus relation ≻0 and the
consensus relation ≻0 coincides with the relation Mpi assigned by the majority
rule to pi. This result gives an interesting sufficient condition for transitivity
of Mpi. Furthermore, regardless of parity of n, the ≻0-largest element a1 is a
Condorcet winner on pi.
For small values of r, level r consensus relations ≻0 of profile pi have some
interesting additional properties. Namely, the largest element a1 with respect
≻0 is selected by any scoring rule. A scoring rule is characterized by a non-
increasing sequence S = (S1, S2, . . . , SK) of non-negative real numbers for which
S1 > SK . For k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, each individual with the preference relation ≻
assigns Sk points to the k-th alternative in the linear order ≻. The scoring rule
associated with S is the function VS : P
n → 2A whose value at any profile
pi = {≻1,≻2, . . . ,≻n} is the set VS(pi) of alternatives a with the maximum total
score (i.e. with the maximum sum
∑
1≤i≤K Ski where ki is the rank of a in ≻i).
Theorem 2 in [1] claims that if a preference profile pi exhibits consensus of level
r ≤ (K − 1)! around ≻0, then the ≻0-largest element a1 belongs to VS(pi) for all
scoring rules VS .
However, the authors did not notice some combinatorial properties of the
concepts introduced. We show that the hierarchy of preference profile partially
collapses. In particular, any profile pi ∈ P that exhibits consensus of level (K−1)!
around ≻0 in fact exhibits consensus of level 1 around ≻0. Thus, it would be
desirable to slightly adjust the assumption of Theorem 2 of [1].
Theorem 1 For any natural numberK > 2 there is a natural number c ≤ K(K−1)4
such that for any natural numbers n ≥ 1 and r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K!2 − c}, any pref-
erence profile pi ∈ Pn, and any linear order ≻0∈ P the following conditions are
equivalent
1. pi exhibits consensus of level r around ≻0
2. pi exhibits consensus of level 1 around ≻0.
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Proof. The implication 2 → 1 follows from Proposition 1 of [1]. We will prove
the reverse implication. Let ≻0 be a linear order in P and let
Pk(≻0) = {≻∈ P : d(≻,≻0) = k}.
for any natural number k. Obviously, |Pk(≻0)| coincides with the number of
permutations of {1, 2, . . . ,K} with k inversions, i.e. with the Mahonian number
T (K, k) (sequence A008302 in OEIS, see [2]). The set PK(K−1)
2
contains exactly
one element. We denote this element by ≻0: PK(K−1)
2
= {≻0}.
Let c′ be the number of k for which T (K, k) is odd:
c′ = |{k ∈ N : T (K, k) ≡ 1 (mod 2)}|.
So, c′ ≤ K(K−1)2 because
K(K−1)
2 is the maximum distance between the linear
orders in P . Moreover, c′ is even because∑
0≤k≤K(K−1)2
T (K, k) = K! ≡ 0 (mod 2).
Let c = c
′
2 . Then the inequality c ≤
K(K−1)
4 holds.
Definition 3 For any natural number m a pair (C1, C2) ∈ 2
P × 2P is called
m-balanced (around ≻0) iff
1. C1 ∩ C2 = ∅,
2. |C1| = |C2| = m,
3. |C1 ∩ Pk(≻0)| = |C2 ∩ Pk(≻0)| for any k = 0, 1, . . . ,
K(K−1)
2 .
Lemma 1 Let ≻1,≻2∈ P \ {≻0,≻0} and ≻1 6=≻2. Then there is a (
K!
2 − c)-
balanced pair (C1, C2) for which ≻1∈ C1 and ≻2∈ C2.
Proof. Note that T (K, k) ≥ 2 for any k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K(K−1)2 − 1} (this follows,
for example, from a recurrence formula for T (K, k), see [2]). Using this fact,
for each k ∈ {k ∈ N : T (K, k) ≡ 1 (mod 2)} choose a preference relation
≻(k)∈ Pk(≻0) \ {≻1,≻2}. Let
P ′k(≻0) =
{
Pk(≻0) if T (K, k) ≡ 0,
Pk(≻0) \ {≻(k)} if T (K, k) ≡ 1
(mod 2).
For each k ∈ {1, . . . , K(K−1)2 − 1} choose a set C(k) with properties
1. C(k) ⊆ P
′
k
(≻0),
2. |C(k)| =
|P′
k
(≻0)|
2 ,
3. d(≻1,≻0) = k →≻1∈ C(k),
4. ≻2 /∈ C(k).
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Let
C1 =
⋃
1≤k≤K(K−1)2 −1
C(k) and C2 =
⋃
1≤k≤K(K−1)2 −1
P ′k(≻0) \ C(k).
Obviously, items 1– 3 of Definition 3 hold. Lemma 2 is proved.
Lemma 2 For any natural number m and m-balanced pair (C1, C2) there is a
one-to-one function φ : C1 → C2 satisfying
d(≻,≻0) = d(φ(≻),≻0)
for all ≻∈ C1.
Proof. By item 3 of Definition 3 for any k = 0, 1, . . . , K(K−1)2 there is a one-to-one
mappings φk : C1 ∩Pk(≻0)→ C2 ∩Pk(≻0) (maybe empty if C1 ∩Pk(≻0) = ∅).
Obviously, we can put φ =
⋃
0≤i≤
K(K−1)
2
φk. Lemma 3 is proved.
Corollary 1 For any natural number m and m-balanced pair (C1, C2)
C1 ≥≻0 C2 and C2 ≥≻0 C1.
Proof. Let φ be a function from Lemma 2. Then
d(≻,≻0) = d(φ
−1(≻),≻0)
for all ≻∈ C2, and it remains to recall Definition 1.
Let pi ∈ Pn and let pi exhibit consensus of level r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K!2 − c}
around≻0. By Proposition 1 of [1] pi exhibits consensus of level
K!
2 −c around≻0.
Our next goal is to prove that item 1 of Definition 2 holds for the profile pi
and r = 1.
Lemma 3 For any different ≻1,≻2∈ P
d(≻1,≻0) ≤ d(≻2,≻0)→ µpi(≻1) ≥ µpi(≻2).
Proof. Let ≻1,≻2∈ P , ≻1 6=≻2 and d(≻1,≻0) ≤ d(≻2,≻0).
First, let {≻1,≻2}∩{≻0,≻0} = ∅. Consider a (
K!
2 −c)-balanced pair (C1, C2)
for which ≻2∈ C1 and ≻1∈ C2, and a on-to-one function φ : C1 → C2 satisfying
d(≻,≻0) = d(φ(≻),≻0)
for all ≻∈ C1. By Definition 2 and Corollary 3 we have
µpi(C1) = µpi(C2). (1)
Let C′1 = (C1 \ {≻2}) ∪ {≻1} and C
′
2 = (C2 \ {≻1}) ∪ {≻2}. Consider the
function φ′ : C′1 → C
′
2 defined by
φ′(≻) =


≻2 if ≻=≻1,
φ(≻2) if ≻= φ
−1(≻1) 6=≻2,
φ(≻) otherwise.
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For all ≻∈ C′1 we have d(≻,≻0) ≤ d(φ
′(≻),≻0), so C
′
1 ≥≻0 C
′
2 by Definition 1.
Hence, by Definition 2
µpi(C
′
1) ≥ µpi(C
′
2). (2)
Since (∀C ⊆ P)µpi(C) =
∑
≻∈C µpi(≻), we have
µpi(C
′
1) = µpi(C1)− µpi(≻2) +µpi(≻1) and µpi(C
′
2) = µpi(C2)− µpi(≻1) +µpi(≻2).
(3)
Then by (1), (2) and (3)
µpi(≻1)− µpi(≻2) ≥ µpi(≻2)− µpi(≻1),
and, finally,
µpi(≻1) ≥ µpi(≻2).
For further discussion, note that this implies
d(≻1,≻0) = d(≻2,≻0)→ µpi(≻1) = µpi(≻2). (4)
for all different ≻1,≻2∈ P .
Consider the remaining cases.
Let ≻1=≻0 and ≻2 6= ≻0. Then denote C
′′
1 = (C1 \ {≻2}) ∪ {≻0} and C
′′
2 =
(C1 \ {φ(≻2)}) ∪ {≻2}. Consider the function φ
′′ : C′′1 → C2 defined by
φ′′(≻) =
{
≻2 if ≻=≻0,
φ(≻) otherwise.
For all ≻∈ C′′1 we have d(≻,≻0) ≤ d(φ
′′(≻),≻0) and, further, C
′′
1 ≥≻0 C
′′
2 .
Reasoning as before we have
µpi(≻0)− µpi(≻2) ≥ µpi(≻2)− µpi(φ(≻2)).
Since d(≻2,≻0) = d(φ(≻2),≻0), we have µpi(≻2) = µpi(φ(≻2)) by (4). Finally,
µpi(≻0) ≥ µpi(≻2).
In the case ≻2= ≻0 and ≻1 6=≻0, the arguments are similar.
In the latter case ≻1=≻0 and ≻2= ≻0. We can choose a preference relation
≻∗∈ P \ {≻0,≻0}. According to the above, we have
µpi(≻1) ≥ µpi(≻
∗) ≥ µpi(≻2).
Lemma 3 is proved.
To prove the theorem it remains to show that item 2 of Definition 2 holds
for the profile pi and r = 1. Assume µpi(≻0) = ∅. Then, for every preference
relation ≻ of profile pi we have
d(≻,≻0) > d(≻0,≻0) and µpi(≻) > µpi(≻0).
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In the opposite case, assume that item 2 of Definition 2 is not hold for the
profile pi and r = 1. Then by Lemma 3 the profile pi contains the same number
of all linear orders in P . Thus, pi does not exhibit consensus of any level, a
contradiction.
Theorem 1 is proved.
Corollary 2 Let profile pi exhibit consensus of level (K − 1)! around ≻0. Then
pi exhibits consensus of level 1 around ≻0.
Proof. Let K ≥ 4. Then it suffices to prove the inequality
(K − 1)! ≤
K!
2
−
K(K − 1)
4
.
This is easily by induction. For K = 3 we can use the sufficiency of inequality
(K − 1)! ≤
K!
2
−
|{k : T (K, k) = 1 (mod 2)}|
2
(for K = 3 we have |{k : T (3, k) = 1 (mod 2)}| = 2).
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